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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
LOBBYING -MULTI-STATE
STATUTORY
CEDURES FOR LOBBYING AcTvrrTEs.

I.

SURVEY-REQUIREMENTS

AND

PRO-

Introduction

Lobbying procedures can broadly be described as those "efforts by which various
groups or individuals attempt to secure the passage or defeat of legislation." 1 The
control of this practice presents a difficult problem to both state and national law-

makers.
Presently, there appears to be a consensus of opinion that legitimate lobbying
makes a substantial contribution to our legislative process. But protest is loudly
voiced when improper pressures are exerted and corrupt means, such as bribery,
are used to influence the passage or defeat of a proposed statute. The aim of
lobbying legislation is to eliminate these and other abuses. The regulatory measures,
however, are not to be an end in themselves. The ultimate goal sought by such
regulation is, in the words of then Senator and now President John F. Kennedy,
"sound legislative action by Congress, aided in its deliberations by the arguments,
positions and presentations of all segments of our population."' 2 In order to attain
this end, state and federal legislators must strike the proper balance in the measures
they draft. The statute involved must be strict enough to control corrupt practices.
And yet, it cannot be too narrow, lest it run the risk of offending the constitutional
right of the citizenry to present its views to the legislature. Mr. Justice Jackson
alluded to this when he said that the problem for the legislator is "to reach the
real evils of lobbying without cutting into the constitutional right of petition." 3
To date, the federal government4 and 42 of the states5 have enacted legislation
directed specifically at the control of the "evils" in lobbying. State pronouncement
appeared in this area long before Congress saw fit to act. For example, the
Georgia Constitution of 1877 declared lobbying to be a crime,6 and, in 1890,
Massachusetts enacted a statute requiring the registration of "legislative agents." 7
By the year 1944, two years prior to the enactment of the first comprehensive
1 Kennedy, Congressional Lobbies: A Chronic Problem Re-Examined, 45 GEo. L. J.
535 (1957). The exact definition of what actually constitutes lobbying sometimes creates
serious legal problems. The present Federal Act offers no definition of the term. However,
it notes in detail the persons the act was intended to cover. 2 U.S.C. § 266 (1946). The
constitutionality of § 266 has been attacked on the ground of indefiniteness. But a majority
of the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, found that the entire statute met the constitutional
requirement of definiteness. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
The lack of a clear definition of lobbying in the federal statute has also been attacked by
an eminent authority in the field. Zeller, The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 42 Am.
POL. Scm. REv. 239 (1948). Professor Zeller considers this one of the weakest points of the
statute.
For a discussion on whether the Federal Act covers direct and indirect lobbying activities,
see United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1952). The case is an example of the difficulties inherent in a poor definition of the term "lobbying."
2 Kennedy, Congressional Lobbies: A Chr nic Problem Re-Examined, 45 GEo. L.J. 535,
567 (1957).
3 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 636 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
4 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 ('Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act), 60 Stat.
812 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958).
5 The following states do not have legislation specifically directed at lobbying: Delaware,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New- Mexico, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wyoming.
However, as will be seen further on in this review, they all have general legislation which prohibits corrupt acts such as bribing a member of the legislature.
6 GA. CONST. art. I, § 2-205 (1877). However, in 1878-79, the word "lobbying" was
defined by the Georgia legislature in a manner which outlawed only corrupt types of lobbying.
GA. CoDE ANN. § 47-1001 (1953). Both provisions are still law in Georgia. See notes 33 and
34 infra.
7 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 3, § 40 (1961).
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federal statute in this field, 35 states had regulated lobbying in some manner.8 In
1928 and during the mid-1930's, the Federal Congress made several attempts to
enact lobbying regulations9 and, in certain cases, passed such legislation. 10 However,
these laws were limited in their scope to several particular pressure groups seeking
to lobby. As mentioned, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 was the
first comprehensive federal effort to control lobbyists."- Notwithstanding the fact
that there has been a great volume of legislation in this area, it is the general opinion
of legal scholars and Congressmen
that the present lobbying laws, state, as well as
12
federal, are inadequate.
This survey will be limited to an analysis of the lobbying regulations in force
in the several states. The primary objective is to provide a guide as to what, if
any, initial steps must be taken in each of the 50 states before lobbying can legally
be commenced, and to indicate specifically that which is prohibited, as well as the
penalties which may be incurred where failure of compliance occurs. It is thereby
intended as a practical aid to parties interested in multi-state lobbying activities.13
II. "Direct" and "Indirect" Regulation
All of the states have regulations which, directly or indirectly, affect those
groups or individuals who attempt to influence legislation. As indicated above,
42 of the states have laws dealing directly with this problem. The remaining
eight states have rules dealing with lobbying in an indirect manner.' 4 Legislation
enacted in the state of Michigan is exemplary of those statutes which deal "directly"
8 Zeller, State Regulation of Legislative Lobbying, in THE Boox OF THE STATES 161
(1943-44).
9 In 1928, Senator Thaddeus H. Caraway of Arkansas introduced a lobbying measure
which only the Senate passed. 69 CONG. REc. 3931-35 (1928). In 1935, Senator (now Justice) Hugo L. Black of Alabama introduced a lobbying bill which was passed by the Senate,

but went no further. 79 CONG. R.c. 8306 (1935). In the second session of the 74th Congress,
Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia introduced a bill which passed only the House.
80 CONG. REC. 4541
refused to accept the
10 Congress, due
1935, wrote into the

(1936). Both bills were sent to a conference committee, but the House
conference compromise and the bills died. 80 CONG. Rac. 9753 (1936).
in part to the nationwide attention attracted by the utilities lobby in
Public Utility Holding Companies Act of 1935 certain lobbying regula-

tions and conditions. 49 Stat. 823, 15 U.S.C. § 79 1(i) (1958).
In 1936 Congress turned its attention on the shipbuilders' and ship operators' lobby and
regulated these groups by compelling registration with the United States Maritime Commis-

sion. 66 Stat. 765, 46 U.S.C. § 1225 (1958).
11 60 Stat. 812 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261-70 (1958).
12 Professor Belle Zeller states the basic complaints to the Federal Act of 1946 and goes
on to offer sound recommendations to remedy same. See, Zeller, The Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act, 42 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 239 (1948).

Senator John F. Kennedy made the following observation:
Considerable variation in the effectiveness of the various statutes has been
noted, the common weakness in the state efforts being the same as one of
the principal weaknesses in the Federal statute, namely, the failure to assign
responsibility for administration and enforcement to an effective agency or
officer.... The experience of the States in attempting to regulate lobbying
does not provide much encouragement. (Citations omitted.) Kennedy,
CongressionalLobbies: A Chronic Problem Re-Examined, 45 GEo. L.J. 535,
546 (1957).

Senators John L. McClellan and Styles Bridges directed the following comment toward
the Federal Act: "The statute has proven beneficial but has been found, by experience, to
contain a number of uncertainties . . . and also to be deficient and inadequate in other
respects." 103 CONG. Rc. 8137 (1957).
13 Because of the limited scope of this survey, discussion of certain related lobbying points

has been virtually omitted. One such matter - the question of whether expenditures for the
promotion or defeat of legislation are deductible for income tax purposes - was recently reviewed by the Supreme Court in the case of Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498
(1959). The Court held that expenditures for publicity aimed at the defeat of an initiative
measure were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. A thorough discussion of this question can be found in 46 VA. L. Rav. 112 (1960).
14 These states are:
Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Washington,

and Wyoming.
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with the problems involved in lobbying.' 5 Michigan requires that lobbyists register
with the Secretary of State, perform their tasks on a noncontingent fee basis, and
keep detailed financial records. Not all of the states which have regulations directly
affecting lobbying go into the detail that the Michigan statute does; however, all
of them do explicitly address certain aspects of lobbying. 16 The Minnesota statutes
provide an example of an "indirect" prohibition on certain lobbying practices.17
The Minnesota legislation, while not mentioning lobbying practices specifically,
provides a substantial penalty for the use of corrupt means such as bribery to
influence legislation. Minnesota, and other jurisdictions classed as "indirect," do
not attempt to regulate the general area of lobbying.
The state controls on lobbying can conveniently be placed into two separate
categories. First, 23 of the states have legislation and/or constitutional, provisions
dealing with corrupt lobbying practices only. These laws are limited to defining
the prohibited acts and to imposing sanctions for -various improper practices.
Therefore, within these jurisdictions, there is no registration and, consequently,
no need for concern as to what formal steps must be taken with the local authorities before lobbying activities may be undertaken. Twenty-seven of the states can
be placed in the second category. These states have statutes which call for the
registration of all lobbyists. This type of legislation apparently manifests the supposition that publicity will compel the lobbyist to limit himself to the more desirable
types of lobbying. The information gathered through registration also enables
legislators to know the identity and the purposes of those who contact them. In
these jurisdictions which require registration, there must be compliance with certain
initial procedures. The procedures and information requirements that follow will
be of a general nature and are included only by way of example, in order to show
the most typical requirements. Specific information for any particular state is
contained in the chart below.' 8
III. Sample State Registration Requirements
The first step in the process of registration is to file -the requested data with
the proper public official. This person is usually the Secretary of State, but in some
jurisdictions it is the Attorney General or another designated official. Pursuant to
the theory that publicity of his activities will convince the lobbyist to act in a
desired fashion, all of the information filed with the state officials is open to public
inspection.
The information required to be filed is substantially the same in all states
which call for registration. The demands of the California statute serve as an
example of what is required.' 9 Under that statute, the lobbyist is obliged to file
"in writing and under oath, his name and business address, the name and address
of the person by whom he is employed, and in whose interest he appears or works,
the duration of such employment, how much he is paid and is to receive, by whom
he is paid or is to be paid, 2how
much he is to be paid for expenses, and what
0
expenses are to be included."
Significantly, the proposed legislation which the lobbyist has been hired to
support or oppose must also be submitted. In many states, the person required
to provide this information is the employer of the lobbying agent. 'Further under
the California law, the lobbying agent must file a written authorization from each
of his employers.
15 MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 2.601-2.610 (1961).
'16 See the Oregon statute which makes it a crime for any person to attempt to influence a
legislator without first "truly and completely disclosing to the member his interest therein, or
that of his principal and his own agency therein,. .. ." ORE. REv. STAT. § 162.520 (1953).
17 MrNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.02-613.07 (1945).
18 A breakdown indicating the 23 states which do not require registration procedures and
the 27 states which do, can be found in the chart below.
19 CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 9900-11.
20 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 9906.
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Several of the states place a time limit on the filing of such information, such
as the Ohio statute which declares that the registration must be effected within
one week of the employment agreement date."1 Others specify that such registration may be made at any time before the lobbying activities actually begin. 22 The
chart below makes note of the time limitations in all of those jurisdictions which
have them.
A further concern to the lobbyist in a registration jurisdiction is the filing
of a financial statement. Twenty of the states which require registration also
require the filing of detailed financial reports. 2 3 The Ohio statute typifies what
these various statutes demand of an itemized financial report.2 4 The financial
statement of a lobbyist in Ohio must be filed with the Secretary of State within
30 days after the final adjournment of any session of the general assembly. The
itemized accounting must show, under oath and in detail, "expenses paid, incurred,
or promised, directly or indirectly, in connection with any matter that was pending
or that might legally have come before the general assembly or either house
thereof . . . with the names of the payees and the amounts paid to each, and

specifying the nature of the matter that was pending or that might legally have
come before the general assembly . . . , and the interest of the person, firm, or

corporation, or association therein."25 The provision further calls for the disclosure of the amount of value given and the names and addresses of all contributors
to the particular activities in question.26
These two requirements, namely, those of the initial registration procedure
and the filing of a detailed financial report, are the fundamental considerations
in those states which make registration compulsory.
IV.

Other Relevant Statutory Provisions
Ten of the states requiring registration of lobbyists make a distinction between
"legislative counsels" and "legislative agents. '2T The definitions given to these
classifications by the Massachusetts statute is typical. "Legislative counsel" is
defined as "any person who for compensation appears at any public hearing before
any committee of the general court in regard to proposed legislation, and who
does no other acts in regard to the same except such things as are necessarily
incident to such appearance before such a committee."2 s A "legislative agent" is
defined by the statute as "any person who for hire or reward does any act to
promote or oppose legislation except to appear at a public hearing before a
committee of the general court as legislative counsel." 29 The distinction appears
to have little practical significance. The only real difference seems to be the
requirement of separate registration on the docket of the designated authority.
For example, when one registers in the state of Massachusetts, he must specify
to the Sergeants-at-Arms of both legislative houses whether he will act as a
legislative counsel or a legislative agent.30
Lobbying laws are not all statutory. There are 16 states that have constitutional provisions affecting lobbying.2" The majority of these provisions simply
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 101.71 (Page 1953).
22 Connecticut laws provide an example of this procedure. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §
2-45 (1958).
23 See chart infra.
24 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 101.75 (Page 1953).
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 These states are: Alaska, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, New York,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
28 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 3, § 39 (1961).
29 Ibid.
30 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 3, § 40 (1961).
31 ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 101; ARuz. CONST. art. 22, § 19; ARx. CONST. art. 5, § 35; CAL.
CONST. art. 4, § 35; COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 40; DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 22; GA. CONST. art.
I, § 2-205; LA. CONST. art. 3, § 30 (1954); MD. CONST. art. III, § 35 (Supp.); MONT.
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outlaw corrupt practices such as bribery. For instance, the Delaware constitutional
provision proclaims, in part, that "Every person who shall give, offer or promise,
directly or indirectly, any money.., to any member of either House of the General
Assembly for the purpose of influencing him in the performance of any of his
official or public duties shall be deemed guilty of bribery.... ,32
As was mentioned 'previously, the Constitution of Georgia is unique in that
it flatly declares lobbying to be a crime.33 However, the interesting interpretation
given to the word "lobbying" by the Georgia lawmakers greatly weakens the impact
of this constitutional prohibitionP 4 The definition explicitly concerns itself with
influence that is not addressed solely to the "judgment" of the legislator or influence
that is presented by one who has "misrepresented" his interest in the matter.s5
Thus, "lobbying," as defined in the Georgia statute, refers to an illegal type of
solicitation. By reason of the absolute prohibition against lobbying in the Georgia
Constitution the above definition seems to have been necessary. It is submitted
Amendment
that a blanket prohibition against lobbying would violate the First 38
to the Constitution of the United States and therefore be held invalid.
Alaska and Indiana stand alone in their statutory requirements that lobbyists
be compelled to take a loyalty oath before being allowed to present their views
to the legislature. The pertinent part of the Alaska statute reads as follows:
"Every lobbyist . . . shall take the non-Communist oath required of Territorial

employees and a copy of this non-Communist oath shall be filed in the office of
the Director of Finance .... It shall be unlawful for any member of any Communist, Fascist or subversive organization, as classified and listed by the Attorney
General of the United States, to promote, advocate or oppose the. passage or
defeat by the Legislature of. any bill, resolution or legislative measure."37 The
Indiana "loyalty oath" clause is substantially identical to that of Alaska. 38
Five states require that a specified number of copies of all written statements,
arguments, and briefs proffered to members of the General Assembly be filed with
the designated state officials. Idaho requires that two copies of these written briefs
and related materials be filed with the Secretary of State.3 9 Kansas goes somewhat
further, in requiring 40 copies of the written arguments to be filed with the
V, § 41; N.M. CONST. art. IV, §§ 39-41; N.D. CONST. art. II, § 40; PA. CONST.
art. 3, §§ 29 and 30 and art. 2, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. 3, §§ 4, 28; WASH. CONST. art. 2, §
30; WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 42.
32 DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 22.
33 GA. CONST. art. I, § 2-205.
34 This definition also-serves as an example of the problems that can arise in defining "lobbying." See also note 1 supra.
Lobbying is any personal solicitation of a member of the General Assembly, during a session thereof, ... not addressed solely to the judgment,
to favor or oppose, or to vote for or against any bill, resolution, report, or
claim, pending or to be introduced in either branch thereof, by any person
who misrepresents the nature of his interest in the matter to such member,
or who is employed for a consideration by a person or corporation interested in the passage or defeat of such bill... , for the purpose of procuring
the passage or defeat thereof. But this shall not include such service as
drafting petitions, bills, or resolutions, attending to the taking of testimony,
collating facts, preparing arguments and memorials, and submitting them
orally, or in writing, to a committee or member of the Gen. Assembly,
and other services of the character, intended to reach the reason of the
legislators. Lobbying shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary
for not less than one year nor more than five years. GA. CODE ANN. §
47-1001 (1953).
35 Ibid.
36 The First Amendment's guarantee of the right of petition appears to protect lobbying.
Professor Corwin contends that lobbying is the most important expression of the right of petition. CoRWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 810 (1953 ed.).
37 ALASKA ComP. LAWS ANN. § 35-2-181 (Supp. 1958).
38 IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-301(a) (Supp. 1961).
39 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4707 (1947).
CONST. art.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
State Librarian.4 0 The Oklahoma legislature has provided that 20 copies of the
briefs must be registered with the Chief Clerk of the House.4' In South Dakota,
25 copies must be submitted to the Secretary of State, 42 and, in Wisconsin, three
such copies must be filed with the Secretary of State.4
The states of Idaho, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and South Dakota, all have
explicit statutory restrictions against "private" lobbying. Private lobbying can be
defined as direct, personal influence asserted by the lobbyist on an individual
legislator. In Idaho, the lobbyist is not allowed to influence an individual legislator
on a person to person basis. 44 He is only permitted to make his argument before
a committee, and only when the committee is in session.45 Lobbying, as that word
is defined in the statute, is declared illegal in Louisiana.4" This definition serves
to make all direct and private influencing an unlawful act. However, public activity
and public communications with legislators are excluded from the statute's definition of lobbying and are permissible. 47 The prohibition against private lobbying in
Louisiana is so strictly drafted that not even letters to a legislator may remain private,48 provided, of course, the letters are concerned with pending legislation. The
Oklahoma statute permits the lobbyist to appear only before a.regular committee of
the General Assembly and only when such committee is in session. 49 Though
registration as such is not mandatory in Oklahoma, the person seeking to lobby
must make a written application, containing essentially the same information as
is required under normal registration procedures, to the presiding officer of the
House before whose committee he desires to appear. This must be approved by
the majority of such House before he is permitted to appear. The practical effect,
therefore, is the same as formal registration with a different state functionary.5 0
Direct or private lobbying, as it is defined by the Oklahoma statute, is declared
contrary to the "public policy, and against the best interest of the people of the
State of Oklahoma .. ."51 In South Dakota, the same limitations
exist. The
52
lobbyist in that state is only allowed to argue before committee.
A failure to comply with the lobbying regulations of a particular state subjects
the violator to a variety of penalties. These penalties apply to the employer of
the lobbyist as well as to the lobbyist. The sanctions are by no means uniform.
For example, a violation of the lobby registration law in South Carolina carries
with it a maximum penalty of a $100.00 fine and/or 30 days in jail.5 3 This seems
to be the mildest penalty in"
any of the fifty states. In contrast, a party in violation
of the Minnesota provisions subjects himself to a maximum penalty of a $5,000.00
fine and/or 10 years in prison. 4 In addition to fines and jail sentences, nine
states have disbarment provisions, i.e., the violator is denied the right to lobby
for a period of three years after his conviction.5 5 An important constitutional
question was raised in reference to an identical disbarment provision in the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act. In United States v. Harriss,5 6 a Federal District

43
44

KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-206 (1949).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 314 (1951).
S.D. CODE § 55.0705 (1939).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 13.66(2) (1957).
IDAHO C0ODE ANN. § 18-4707 (1947).

45

Ibid.

40
41

42

STAT. § 24:51 (1950).
LA. REV. STAT. § 24:53 (1950).
Ibid.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 313 (1951).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 314 (1951).
Ibid.
S.D. CODE § 55.0705 (1939).
S.C. CODE § 30-157 (1952).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 613.02 (1945).
These states are: Alaska, California, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Dakota,
Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
109 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1953).

46 LA. REv.
47
48
49

50
51
52
53
54

55
Rhode
56
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Court held that the penalty clause in the Federal Act, which proscribed any person
convicted under the act from lobbying for a three-year. period, was unconstitutional
since it denied the individual of the right to petition Congress. On appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held the act constitutional. 57 However, the Court did not consider the constitutionality of the disbarment penalty. s
Te chart that follows below is designed to give a quick guide to the essential
procedures, limitations, and prohibitions involved in each of the fifty states. The
headings on the chart can be briefly explained: (1) "Limited to Corrupt Lobkying"
refers to those states which prohibit illegal practices such as bribery, but do not
attempt to control lobbying in general. (2) "Registration States; and, Place of
Registration" refers to those jurisdictions which require registration and attempt
to control lobbying in general. (3) "Who must Register" refers to the exact party
required to register. The word "both" on the chart is intended to include the
employer and the lobbyist. (4) "Registration Time Limit" refers to the time limit
in which registration must take place. (5) "Financial Report Required" refers
to those states which require a financial report to be filed subsequent to the lobbying
activities. (6) "Contingent Fees Illegal" refers to those states where lobbyists are
prohibited from working for a fee contingent on the success of their lobbying efforts.
An X on the chart indicates that the referred-to heading is applicable in that state.

STATZ
Alabama

Limited to
Corrupt
Lobbying59
X

Alaska
X
X

California
Colorado

X

Financial Contingent
Report
Fees
Required
Illegal

Both
Lobbyist
and Employer

X

X

and Secretary of the Senate

Lobbyist

X

X

Secretary of State

Lobbyist

X

X

Director of Finance

Arizona
Arkansas

Connecticut
Delaware

STATE LOBBYING LEGISLATION
Registration States;
Who
Registration
and,
Must
Time
Place of RegistrationSO
Register
Limit

Chief Clerk of the Assembly

Before Service
Rendered

X

57 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1953).
58 Id. at 627. In its opinion the Court considered the question of whether Congress, in
light of the freedom of speech and petition clauses in the First Amendment, could require the
disclosure of lobbying activities. Id. at 626 the Court answered this question in the affirmative and wrote as follows: "The hazard of such restraint is too remote to require striking
down a statute which on its face is otherwise plainly within the area of congressional power
and is designed to safeguard a vital national interest."
59 Those states whose laws are limited to corrupt lobbying actions are: ALA. CODE tit. 14,
§§ 352, 353 (1940); Amiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-285, 13-286 and §§ 41-1222 to 41-1223;
ARx. CONST. art. 5, § 35; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-7-5 to 40-7-7 (1953); DEL. CONST.
art. 2, § 22; HAwAnIREv. LAWS 265-1, 2 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4703 to 18-4707
(1947); IOWA CODE ANN. § 2.24(2) (1946); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 49:71-49:76 and §§ 24:5124:55 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 613.02-613.07 (1945); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 21.420
(Supp. 1961); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 94-2913 to 94-2919 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT.
vol. 2, 198.010 (1960); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A:93-2, 2A:93-3 (1951); N.M. CoNST. art.
IV, §§ 39-41; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, §§ 313-320 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT. § 162.520
(1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 458 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39.820 (1956); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-28-26 (1953); WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 30; IW.VA. CODE ANN. § 6110
(1961); Wyo. CONST. art. 3, § 42.
60 The state statutes having registration provisions are: ALASKA Coisp. LAWS ANN. §§
35-2-182 to 35-2-185, §§ 35-2-187 to 35-2-192 (1949), §§ 35-2-181, 35-2-186, 35-2-193 (Supp.
1958); CAL. GoV'T. CODE §§ 9900-9905, §§ 9906.2-9911 (1955), § 9906 (Supp. 1961); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 2-45, § 53-150, § 53-152 (1958), § 53-151 (Supp. 1961); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 11.05-11.06 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-504 §§ 47-1001 to 47-1006 (1953), §§ 26-5022 to
26-5023 (Supp. 1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 63, §§ 110-112 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961), § 113
(Smith-Hurd 1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-301 to 34-309 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46-201 to 46-210 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.250-6.990 (1955); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. ch. 10, §§ 34-39 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 40, §§ 5-14 (1957); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 3, §§ 39-50 (1961); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 2.601-2.610 (1961); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 3366-
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STATE LOBBYING LEGISLATION
STATZ

Limited to
Corrupt
Lobbying59

Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

RegistrationStates;
and,
Place of RegistrationGO
X61

Who
Must
Register

Registration
Time
Limit

Secretary of State

Lobbyist

Before Service
Rendered

Secretary of State

Lobbyist

I wk. after
employment

Financial Contingent
Fees
Report
Illegal
Required
X

X

X
X

Illinois

X

1 wk. after

Indiana
Iowa

Secretary of State

Lobbyist

Secretary of State

Lobbyist

Attorney General

Lobbyist

Maine

Secretary of State

Both

Maryland

Secretary of State

Both

Massachusetts

Sergeant-at-Arms

Both

Secretary of State

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana62

employment

X

X

X
Before Service
Rendered
1 wk. after
employment

X
X

X
48 hrs, after
employment
1 wk. after
employment

X
X

X

X

X

Lobbyist

employment
Befoie Service
Rendered

X

X

Secretary of State

Employer

5 days afte
employment

x

x

Secretary of State

Lobbyist
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3373 (1956); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 50-302 to 50-307 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:115:7 (1955); N.Y. LEoIs. § 66; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-40 to 120-47 (1958); N.D. CONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 54-05-01 to 54-05-09 (1960); Oio RV.CODE ANN. §§ 101.71-101.99 (Page
1953); R.I. GEN.LAWS ANN.§§ 22-10-01 to 22-10-09 (1956); S.C. CODE §§ 30-151 to 30-157
(1952); S.D. CODE §§ 55. 0701-55.0707 (1939), §§ 55.9903, 55.0702-1 (Supp. 1960); TEx.

LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
V. Lobbying and the Constitution
Lobbying laws which require registration have been attacked on the ground
that they violate the First Amendment's right of petition. 64 The right of petition
existed at least as early as the year 1215 and Magna Carta.65 The Great Charter
provided in part:
That if we, our justiciary, our bailiffs, or any of our officers, shall
in any circumstances have failed in the performance of them toward
any person, or shall have broken through any of these articles of peace
and security, and the offence be notified to four barons chosen out of
the five-and-twenty before mentioned, the said four barons shall repair to
us, or our justiciary, if we are out of the realm, and laying open the
grievance, shall petition to have it redressed without delay.68

United States v. Cruikshank 7 appears -to be the first Supreme Court case to
consider the right of petition, though it did not deal expressly with the subject of
lobbying. In this early decision, the Court described this right in the following
terms.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an
attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of,
and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation
in respect to public affairs and to petition for
a redress of grievances. 8

At present, lobbying is generally regarded as the most important expression of
this right. 69
The constitutional question in this area can be framed as follows: Do lobbying
statutes which require registration violate the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, namely, the freedom to speak, publish, and petition the Government?70 In
7
United States v. Harriss,
1-the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative.
The problem in this type of legislation does not arise from the government's
efforts to suppress corrupt lobbying practices. This power is conceded. The constitutional attack on lobbying registration laws is based on the fact that all lobbyists,
as a condition of their engaging in their proposed activities, are required to register.
This, it is contended, is a restraint on the First Amendment guarantees of the
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the right to Petition the Government.
72
The Court, in United States v. Harriss,
justfied this restraint on the right of
petition in the following language:
PEN. CODE ANN. art. 183-1, art. 183-2 (Supp. 1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, §§ 251-255
(1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-283 (1960); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 13.60-13.71 (1957).

61 Registration does not appear to be mandatory in Florida. The lobbyist may be required
to give registration information by the committee of the legislature before which he is appearing. This is not absolute, and as mentioned, seems to be within the discretion of the particular
legislative committee. FLA. STAT. ANN. 11.05 (1961).
62 Louisiana requires the registration of those who carry on lobbying activities before any
State Board, LA. REV. STAT. § 49:71 (1950) but there seems to be no registration demand on
those who conduct such activities with the legislative branch of the government. LA. REv. STAT.
§§ 24:51-24:55 (1950).
63 The registration of detailed information is not necessary in Oklahoma. However, the
lobbyist in this state must receive written permission from the presiding officer of the House and
approval of the House before whose committee he wishes to appear before he can commence
his activities. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 314 (1951).
64 See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
65 CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 805 (1953 ed.).
66 Ibid. Note particularly n.1 on 805.
67 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
68 Id. at 552.
69 CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 810 (1953 ed.).
70 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
71 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
72 Ibid.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to
which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the American
ideal of government by elected representatives depends to no small extent
on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures. Otherwise the voice
of the people may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special
interest groups seeking favored treatment while masquerading as proponents of the public weal....
Toward that end, Congress has not sought to prohibit these pressures. It has merely provided for a modicum of information from those
who for hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend
funds fr" that purpose. It wants only 73to know who is being 'hired, who
is putting up the money, and how much.

The Supreme Court thus held, three justices dissenting, 74 that the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act was constitutional.
Litigation considering the constitutionality of state registration statutes has
been limited. In Campbell v. Commonwealth 7 5 the only decision found which
considered the point, the constitutionality of the Kentucky lobbying act was considered and the act, including its registration provisions was upheld.
VI.

Conclusion
There are, as we have seen, two types of state laws in regard to lobbying regulations. One division includes those jurisdictions which only attempt to prevent
illegal lobbying activities such as bribery. The second classification consists of
those states which seek to control all lobbying activities by means of "registration"
statutes. The rationale underlying this latter type of legislation is that "the spotlight of publicity is a pressure so strong as to compel lobbyists to engage in only
76
the more desirable forms of lobbying."
The two primary requirements in a registration state are: (1) registration with
the proper state official within the proscribed time limit and (2) the filing of a
financial report subsequent to the activities in question. On their face, these statutory
regulations appear sound. However, they have frequently been attacked on grounds
of inadequacy 7 7 The main deficiency in this legislation seems to be the failure to
delegate responsibility for administration and enforcement to an effective government agency.78 It is submitted, however, that registration statutes contain the groundwork for an effective control of lobbying practices.
Addressing his remarks to the need for contfols on lobbying, then Senator John
F. Kennedy wrote as follows:
Aside from the fact that the constitutional right to petition Congress
must not be unduly restricted, another important reason for protecting
the right of members of this third chamber to present their views lies
in the real contribution they make to the legislative process. Congress
should, however, seek to guard against abuses of the right of petition
and should be fully informed of the interests of those who would influence
legislative action. Moreover, the public has a significant interest in the
legislative process and is entitled to know something about the legislative
agents who play such an important role in that process.
[A]lthough lobbying is a proper subject for congressional investigation
and legislation, these are means, not ends. The ultimate goal is sound
legislative action by Congress, aided in its deliberations by the9 arguments,
positions and presentations of all segments of our population7

Frank P. Maggio
73 Id. at 625.
74 Justices Douglas, Black, and Jackson dissented.
75 229 Ky. 264, 17 S.W.2d 227 (1929).
76 Kennedy, Congressional Lobbies: A Chronic Problem Re-Examined, 45 GEo. L. J. 537
(1957).
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